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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion 
for five days notice prior to an order to show cause hearing? 
II. Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion 
to close and clear the case for lack of jurisdiction? 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) 1953 as amended, and Utah Code 
Annotated Section 77-35-26(2)(b) 1953 as amended whereby a defendant 
in a criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from 
an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of 
the defendant. In this case, the order was issued by the Honorable 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
CHARLES W. FOLTZ, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 890174-CA 
Priority #2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an Order denying defendant's Motions 
for five days notice prior to an order to show cause hearing and to 
terminate probation on the underlying offense of Driving Under the 
Influence. The Motions were heard on February 24, 1989, before 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve, in the Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake 
Department. The Court revoked and reinstated probation for four 
months and the defendant was ordered to pay all fines and fees in 
full by May 24, 1989. A Certificate of Probable Cause was issued by 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve on March 28, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 30, 1987, Mr. Charles w. Foltz, Jr., pleaded 
guilty to Driving Under the Influence, a Class B misdemeanor. On 
April 20, 1987, Judge Robert C. Gibson sentenced Mr. Foltz to six 
(6) months jail, suspending all but ten days. He placed Mr. Foltz 
on one (1) year probation to Alcohol Counseling and Education Center 
(A.C.E.C.) Conditions of the one (1) year probation were that 
Mr. Foltz: 1) live rules and regulations; 2) stay out of trouble; 
3) attend A.C.E.C. classes; 4) pay fine, fees and costs and 
restitution ($600.00 fine, $150.00 fee, $100.00 Victim Restitution 
Fund, and $250.00 - attorney fee); 5) serve ten (10) days jail work 
release. 
A warrant was ordered on the defendant on December 7, 1987; 
an Order to Show Cause hearing was held February 25, 1988 after 
Mr. Foltz was booked into jail. Probation was revoked and 
reinstated for one year on February 25, 1988. 
On February 23, 1989, a court review was set; defendant was 
present and an Order to Show Cause hearing was set for the next day, 
February 24, 1989. On February 24, 1989, defendant's motion to 
clear and close the case for lack of jurisdiction was denied and the 
defendant's motion to be given 5 days notice prior to an Order to 
Show Cause hearing was denied. The defendant admitted allegations 
that fines, fees and restitution were not paid in full, probation 
was revoked and reinstated for four months and the defendant was 
ordered to pay all fines and fees in full by May 24, 1989. The 
defendant appeals those decisions. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for 
five days notice prior to an Order to Show Cause hearing. Denial of 
the five days notice violated Mr. Foltz's rights to due process. If 
it were not for this violation, the defendant's probation, even 
under the trial court's view of probation, would have terminated 
prior to the defendant's order to show cause hearing. 
The trial court further erred in denying defendant's motion 
to close and clear the case for lack of jurisdiction which 
jurisdiction terminated by operation of law six (6) months after the 
sentencing of Mr. Foltz. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR FIVE DAYS NOTICE PRIOR TO AN 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING. 
§77-18-1(9)(c) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) states: 
(c) The order to show cause shall specify 
a time and place for the hearing, and 
shall be served upon the defendant at 
least five days prior to the hearing. The 
defendant shall show good cause for a 
continuance. The order to show cause 
shall inform the defendant of a right to 
be represented by counsel at the hearing 
and to have counsel appointed for him if 
he is indigent. The order shall also 
inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
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This requirement of five days notice is consistent with a 
defendant's right to due process of law under Art. I §7 of the 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I §12 of the Constitution of Utah and 
Amendment V to the Constitution of the United States. 
At his Order to Show Cause hearing of February 24, 1989, 
Mr. Foltz, through his attorney, motioned the trial court that it 
comply with the provisions of Utah Code §77-18-1(9)(c)(1987 Supp.) 
and provide the defendant five (5) days notice prior to the hearing 
(T 4, 5, and 6 of the Order to Show Cause Hearing of February 24, 
1989.) That motion was denied (Ibid. T 6). 
The harmfulness of this error is analyzed under the 
standard provided by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30. (Utah R. 
Crim. P. 30 (a)(codified at Utah Code Ann. §77-35-30(a)(1982)). An 
error in a criminal prosecution requires reversal when, absent the 
error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a result more favorable 
to the accused, State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-21 (Utah 1987). 
Had Mr. Foltz's motion for five days notice been granted, 
the outcome at the order to show cause hearing would likely have 
been different. The Court's jurisdiction over Mr. Foltz would have 
been even more tenuous. Under the Court's understanding of 
probation, Mr. Foltz's probation absent a hearing and revocation 
would have expired February 25, 1989. Had Mr. Foltz been granted 
his five days notice, the soonest the hearing could have been held 
was March 1, 1989. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CLOSE AND CLEAR 
MR, FOLTZ'S CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
The defendant's probation terminated upon operation of law 
six (6) months after sentencing on a Class B misdemeanor. Utah Code 
Ann. §77-18-1(7)(a)(Supp. 1987)(See Addendum). State v. Green, 757 
P.2d 462 (Utah 1988); State v. Penney, 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(7)(a)(1987 Supp.)(See Addendum) 
states: "Upon completion of . . . six months [probation] in Class B 
misdemeanor cases, the probation period shall be terminated, unless 
earlier terminated by the court". 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 
(Utah 1988) held that a court lacks the jurisdiction to revoke a 
defendant's probation if revocation proceedings are not initiated 
before the expiration of the probationary term. 
Mr. Foltz's probation expired by operation of law October 
20, 1987. That was four months before any order to show cause 
hearing was had by the court. 
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CONCLUSION 
On the above grounds, Appellant seeks reversal of the lower 
court's order. Appellant requests that this court find that the 
lower court has no jurisdiction over the defendant as his probation 
has been terminated by operation of law. 
Respectfully submitted this 1-j day of August, 1989. 
\^.. Urv-) A SL 
LLOYD A(. POELMAN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Proba- 77-18-2. Expungement and sealing of 
tion — Supervision — Presen- records. 
tence investigation — Confi- 77-18-5 5. Judgment of death — Defendant to 
dential — Terms — Restitution select firing squad or lethal m-
— Extension or revocation — jection. 
Hearings. 77-18-6. Judgment to pay fine or restitution 
constitutes a lien. 
77-18-L Suspension of sentence — Probation — Supervi-
sion — Presentence investigation — Confidential 
— Terms — Restitution — Extension or revoca-
tion — Hearings. 
(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or of-
fense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and 
place the defendant on probation. Supervised probation by the depart-
ment may not be imposed by the court in cases of class C misdemeanors or 
infractions. The jurisdiction of all probationers referred to the Depart-
ment of Corrections is vested in the court having jurisdiction; custody is 
with the Department of Corrections. 
(b) The legal custody of all probationers not referred to the department 
is vested as ordered by the court having jurisdiction of the defendant. The 
court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and pre-
sentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the de-
partment. These standards shall be based on the type of offense, the 
demand for services, the availability of agency resources, and other crite-
ria established by the Department of Corrections to determine what level 
of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and Board of Pardons for review and comment 
prior to adoption by the Department of Corrections. 
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections 
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions, or to conduct presentence investigation reports 
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may super-
vise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department 
standards. 
(4) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concur-
rence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a 
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investiga-
tion report from the Department of Corrections or information from other 
sources about the defendant. The presentence investigation report shall in-
clude a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recom-
mendation from the Department of Corrections regarding the payment of 
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restitution by the defendant. The contents of the report are confidential and 
not available except for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the 
Judicial Council and for use by the Department of Corrections. At the time of 
sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or information the defendant or 
the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sen-
tence. This testimony or information shall be presented in open court on 
record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(5) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may 
be required to perform any or all of the following: 
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(b) pay amounts required under Chapter 32a, Title 77, Defense Costs; 
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(d) participate in available treatment programs; 
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
(f) serve a term of home confinement; 
(g) participate in community service restitution programs; 
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
and 
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance 
with Subsections 76-3-201 (3) and (4). 
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible for the collection of fines 
and restitution during the probation period in cases where the court orders 
supervised probation by the department. The prosecutor shall provide notice 
of the restitution order to the clerk of the court. The clerk shall place the order 
on the civil docket and shall provide notice of the order to the parties. The 
order is considered a legal judgment under which the victim may seek civil 
remedy. 
(7) (a) Upon completion without violation of 18 months' probation in felony 
or class A misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor 
cases, the probation period shall be terminated, unless earlier terminated 
by the court. 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court 
and prosecuting attorney in writing 45 days in advance in all cases where 
termination of supervision will occur by law. The notification shall in-
clude a probation progress report and complete report of details on out-
standing fines and restitution orders. 
(c) At any time prior to the termination of probation, upon a minimum 
of five days' notice and a hearing or upon a waiver of the notice and 
hearing by the probationer, the court may extend probation for an addi-
tional term of 18 months in felony or class A misdemeanors or six months 
in class B misdemeanors if fines or restitution or both are owing. 
(8) (a) All time served without violation while on probation applies to ser-
vice of the total term of probation but does not eliminate the requirement 
of serving 18 consecutive months without violation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or six consecutive months without violation in class 
B misdemeanor cases. Any time served by a probationer outside of con-
finement after having been charged with a probation violation and prior 
to a hearing to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward 
the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing 
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to revoke the probation. Any time served in confinement awaiting a hear-
ing or decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute 
service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is 
exonerated at the hearing. 
(b) When any probationer, without authority from the court or the 
Department of Corrections, absents himself from the state, or avoids or 
evades probation supervision, the period of absence, avoidance, or evasion 
tolls the probation period. 
(c) Nothing in this section precludes the court from discharging a pro-
bationer at any time, at the discretion of the court. 
(9) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (7)(c) of this chapter [section], pro-
bation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing 
by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation Probation may not 
be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the condi-
tions of probation have been violated 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts as-
serted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court 
which authorized probation shall determine whether the affidavit estab-
lishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or exten-
sion of probation is justified If the court determines that there is probable 
cause, it shall cause to be served on the defendant a copy of the affidavit 
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, 
modified, or expended. 
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hear-
ing, and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the 
hearing. The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. The 
order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be repre-
sented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if 
he is indigent. The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to 
present evidence. 
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of 
the affidavit. If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting'attorney shall present evidence on the allegations The per-
sons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are 
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defen-
dant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. The defendant may 
call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) After hearing, the court shall make findings of fact. Upon a finding 
that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may 
order the probation revoked, modified, [or] continued, or that the entire 
probation term commence anew If probation is revoked, the defendant 
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed 
(10) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for "willful 
and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bank-
ruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523, U S C A 1985 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L. 212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114, 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; L. 1981, ch. 59, § 2; 1982, § L 
ch. 9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1; Compiler's Notes. — The 1983 amendment 
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch. by chapter 47 made the former second and 
27 
77-18-1 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
third sentences of present subsec (6) present 
subsec (8), added present subsec <6)(f), and 
made minor changes in phraseology, punctua-
tion and style 
The 1983 amendment by chapter 68 deleted 
"provided, however, that the State of Utah 
shall reimburse any county for the actual costs 
of incarceration of a convicted felon sentenced 
to serve in a county jail as a condition of proba-
tion" at the end of present subsec (6)(e) 
The 1983 amendment by chapter 85 made 
the former second and third sentences of 
present subsec (6) present subsec (8), substi-
tuted "include as part of its written order" for 
"state for the court record" in the second sen-
tence of present subsec (8), inserted present 
subsec (9), redesignated following subsections, 
added former subsec (8), which was deleted in 
1984, and present subsec (14) and made minor 
changes in phraseology, punctuation and style 
The 1984 amendment inserted "except in the 
case of class C misdemeanors, for which proba-
tion may not be imposed, and" in the first sen-
tence of subsec (1), added "unless otherwise 
provided by law" to the first sentence of subsec 
(1), deleted a sentence at the end of subsec (1) 
which read "In cases that do not involve an 
indeterminate sentence, the period of proba-
tion may exceed the length of time of the maxi-
mum sentence that could be imposed", inserted 
subsecs (2) and (3), redesignated following 
subsections, inserted "unless otherwise pro-
vided by law" in the first sentence of subsec 
(6), inserted subsec (7), inserted subsecs (10) 
and (11); deleted a former subsec (8) which 
read "Restitution shall be imposed unless 
upon a hearing in court a finding is made that 
restitution is inappropriate pursuant to Sub-
section 76-3-201(3)(b) or the defendant objects 
to its imposition pursuant to Subsection 76-3-
201(3)(c)", inserted subsec (13), and made 
minor changes in phraseology and style 
The 1985 amendment by Chapter 212 substi-
tuted "Department" for "Division" throughout 
the section, substituted "adult probation and 
parole section of the Department of Correc-
ANALYSIS 
Disclosure of presentence report to defendant 
Presentence reports 
Restitution to insurance company 
Disclosure of presentence report to defen-
dant 
Only when disclosure of the presentence re-
port would jeopardize the life or safety of third 
parties should there be deletions from the re-
port to protect them, in such cases, disclosure 
to a defendant of as much of the report as possi-
ble should be made with identifying indicia of 
i person who would be threatened excluded 
tions" for "Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole" in Subsection (4), and made minor 
changes in phraseology 
The 1985 amendment by Chapter 229 substi-
tuted "Department" for "Division" throughout 
the section, inserted "supervised" and 'lay the 
Department of Corrections" in the first sen-
tence and "referred to the Department of Cor-
rections" in the second sentence of Subsection 
(1), substituted "and the Department" for "of 
the offender and the chief agent of the adult 
probation and parole section of the Division" 
near the end of the second sentence of Subsec-
tion (1), added the last sentence of Subsection 
(1), deleted the designation (a) at the begin-
ning of Subsection (4), inserted "or information 
from other sources" in the first sentence of 
Subsection (4), deleted 'the Department of be-
fore "Adult" in the second sentence of Subsec-
tion (4), deleted 'and the supervision of the Di-
vision of Corrections" after "sentence" in Sub-
section (10)(a), inserted "30 days in advance" 
in Subsection (10)(b>, added Subsections (10)(c) 
and (10)(d), inserted 'court or the" in Subsec-
tion (11 Kb), inserted the second sentence of 
Subsection (13), deleted "civil" before "jurisdic-
tion" in the next-to-last sentence of Subsection 
(13), and made minor changes in phraseology 
The 1987 amendment rewrote this section, 
as last amended by Laws 1985, ch 229, § 1, to 
the extent that a detailed analysis is impracti-
cable 
Separability Clause. — Section 3 of Laws 
1983, ch 85 provided "If any provision of this 
act, or the application of any provision to any 
person or circumstance is held invalid, the re-
mainder of this act shall be given effect with-
out the invalid provision or application " 
Cross-References. — Rules of Evidence in-
applicable to sentencing and probation pro-
ceedings, Rules of Evidence, Rule 1101 
Sentencing for infractions, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-205, 76-3-301 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301 
from the report, sealed, and included in the 
record on appeal, m all other cases, full disclo-
sure of the report should be made State v 
Casarez (Utah 1982) 656 P2d 1005 
Presentence reports. 
Fact that record did not substantiate that 
defendant or his counsel viewed presentence 
report did not amount to prejudicial error 
where there was nothing to indicate that their 
28 
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opportunity to view the report was thwarted. companies for their loss in compensating the 
State v. Mitchell (Utah 1983) 671 P.2d 213. bank which acquired the house through fore-
Where information as to defendant's sexual closure. State v. Stayer (Utah 1985) 706 P.2d 
misconduct was reliable and he was given ade~ 611. 
quate notice of the allegations and defendant Law Reviews. — Testing the Limits of the 
did not attempt to call the victim and cross-ex- Court's Exclusive Jurisdiction in Fraud Cases: 
amine her or take the stand himself, the court Discharge v. Criminal Restitution, 1984 
was justified in relying on evidence of defen- B.Y.U. L. Rev. 61. 
dant's sexual misconduct in sentencing defen- A.L.R. — Probation officer's liability for 
dant for burglary. State v. Sweat, 722 P.2d 746 negligent supervision of probationer, 44 
(Utah 1986). A.L.R.4th 638. 
Admissibility of expert testimony as to ap-
Restitution to insurance company. propnate punishment for convicted defendant. 
The court did not exceed its authority in or- 47 A.L.R.4th 1069. 
dering the defendant, convicted of committing Appealability of order suspending imposition 
arson upon his house, to reimburse insurance or execution of sentence, 51 A.L.R. 4th 939. 
77-18-2. Expungement and sealing of records. 
(1) (a) A person convicted of any crime, except a capital felony, first degree 
felony, or second degree forcible felony as defined in Subsection 
76-2-402(3), within this state may petition the convicting court for an 
expungement and for sealing of his record in that court The person shall 
file both the petition and a certificate issued by the Utah Bureau of 
Criminal Identification indicating that there is no record with the bureau 
of an expungement regarding the petitioner. Both documents shall be 
served upon the prosecuting attorney. The court shall then set a date for a 
hearing and notify the prosecuting attorney for the jurisdiction of the 
date set for hearing. Persons having relevant information about the peti-
tioner may testify at the hearing, and the court in its discretion may 
request a written evaluation by the adult parole and probation section of 
the Department of Corrections. 
(b) A person who at the time of petition for expungement has two or 
more convictions for any type of felony offense on his record, not arising 
out of a single criminal episode, or whose felony criminal record has been 
previously expunged, is not eligible for expungement of any of those of-
fenses regardless of type or degree of offense. 
(c) The court shall enter an order that all records in petitioner's case in 
the custody of that court or in the custody of any other court, agency, or 
official be sealed if the court finds: * 
(i) the petitioner has not been convicted of a felony or of a misde-
meanor for a period of seven years in the case of a felony, six years in 
the case of an alcohol-related traffic offense under Title 41, or for a 
period of five years in the case of a class A misdemeanor, or for a 
period of three years in the case of all other misdemeanors or an 
infraction under Title 76, after his release from incarceration, parole, 
or probation, whichever occurs last; 
(ii) that no proceeding involving a crime is pending or being insti-
tuted against the petitioner; and 
(iii) the petitioner has presented to the court a certificate issued by 
the Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification as described in Subsec-
tion QXa). 
(d) The court shall issue to the petitioner a certificate stating the 
court's finding that he has satisfied the court of his compliance with the 
statutory requirements for expungement. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Terry Vernon GREEN, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No, 870137. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 14, 1988. 
Defendant appealed from order of the 
Second District Court, Davis County, Doug-
las L. Cornaby, J., revoking his probation. 
The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that 
trial court did not have authority to revoke 
defendant's probation after defendant's 
probationary period had expired by opera-
tion of statute. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Criminal Law <s»1208.2, 1208.3(1) 
Judges may exercise sentencing discre-
tion within those limits established by legis-
lature; power to fix sentencing limits and 
power to suspend sentence in favor of pro-
bation are not inherent in judiciary but 
must be authorized by statute. 
2. Criminal Law <s=>982.9 
Power to revoke probation must be 
exercised within legislatively established 
limits. 
3. Constitutional Law <£=>52 
Criminal Law <£»978 
Statute providing for automatic termi-
nation of probation after 18 months with no 
probation violations is not unconstitutional 
limitation on sentencing power of judiciary. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-18-l(10)(a) (1984). 
4. Criminal Law <*=>982.7 
Trial court did not have authority to 
revoke defendant's probation after defend-
ant's probationary period had expired by 
operation of statute providing for automat-
ic termination of probation after 18 months 
with no probation violations, although 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 was amended in 
1985 and 1987. See 1985 Utah Laws ch. 229. 
§ 1; 1987 Utah Laws ch. 114, § 1. The provi-
court determined that violation occurred 
during probationary period. U.C.A.1953, 
77-18-l(10)(a) (1984). 
Dale E. Stratford, Ogden, for defendant 
and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, David B. Thompson, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Defendant appeals from the trial court's 
revocation of his probation. He claims that 
his probation term had already been termi-
nated by operation of law pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a) (Supp.1984),1 
which provides for automatic termination 
of probation after eighteen months with no 
probation violations, and that the trial 
court lacked authority to revoke probation 
after the expiration of the statutory period. 
Defendant pleaded guilty on February 7, 
1984, to a charge of issuing bad checks 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1978). 
He was sentenced by the trial court on May 
29, 1984, to an indeterminate term of zero 
to five years in the Utah State Prison, fined 
$1,500, and ordered to pay restitution. The 
court suspended the prison term and the 
fine and placed defendant on probation. 
Defendant agreed as one condition of pro-
bation that he would not violate federal, 
state, or local laws. 
Defendant's case was reviewed several 
times by the court On one of these occa-
sions, February 18, 1986, an Adult Proba-
tion and Parole (AP & P) officer reported 
that Afeiferafctfrt, \a& \xxzi thaxg^A wth two 
counts of sodomy on a child and one count 
of attempted rape of a child. All of these 
offenses were alleged to have been commit-
ted during April, May, and June 1985, a 
time period within the eighteen-month stat-
utory term of defendant's probation. De-
fendant was convicted of all three offenses 
on June 26, 1986. 
AP & P filed an affidavit of probation 
violation with the court on August 5, 1986. 
Because the court was informed that de-
sions defendant relies upon in his challenge are 
currently found in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(7)(a) (Supp.1987). 
STATE v 
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fendant had appealed the June convictions, 
the probation violation matter was contin-
ued to permit the appeal to be decided. No 
order respecting the status of defendant's 
probation was entered. On February 3, 
1987, the court determined that defendant 
had not filed an appeal from the convic-
tions and found defendant in violation of 
his probation. Defendant requested a 
hearing on disposition. Before the sched-
uled date of the hearing, he petitioned this 
Court for a writ of prohibition in order to 
halt the lower court's sentencing hearing. 
We denied the writ On March 25, 1987, 
the trial court held that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(10)(a) (Interim Supp.1984) was 
an unconstitutional limitation on the sen-
tencing power of judges. On March 31, 
1987, defendant was ordered to serve the 
term of zero to five years originally im-
posed upon him for the bad check convic-
tion. A certificate of probable cause was 
issued, and this appeal followed. 
Neither defendant nor the State claims 
on appeal that the lower court was correct 
in holding that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(10)(a) is unconstitutional. Both 
agree that this holding was unnecessarily 
broad. However, the State argues that the 
statute does not automatically terminate 
probation—and therefore does not auto-
matically terminate a judge's continuing 
jurisdiction over a defendant—unless a de-
fendant commits no probation violations 
within the eighteen-month statutory term. 
The State argues for an interpretation of 
the statute that would allow a trial court to 
revoke probation after the expiration of the 
eighteen-month period upon discovery that 
a parole violation occurred during that peri-
od. This interpretation, the State claims, 
furthers the purpose of probation because, 
regardless of when a violation becomes 
known to the State, the defendant has vio-
lated the terms of his probation and the 
public trust associated with probation. 
Defendant argues not only that the stat-
ute is constitutional, but also that proba-
tion terminates by operation of law eigh-
teen months after it is ordered if no proba-
tion violations have been reported to the 
court Unless the court acts to revoke 
probation or extend the term of probation 
. GREEN Utah 463 
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for another eighteen months, according to 
defendant, it loses jurisdiction over a de-
fendant and cannot order execution of the 
underlying sentence upon discovery of a 
prior probation violation. 
This Court has previously held that while 
courts possess judicial discretion in the sen-
tencing of defendants, the power to define 
crimes and fix the punishment for those 
crimes is vested in the legislature. In 
State v. Bishop, 111 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986), 
we held that the minimum mandatory sen-
tencing scheme adopted by the legislature 
for child sexual abuse crimes was constitu-
tional The defendant in Bishop claimed 
that Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403.1 (Supp. 
1987) infringed upon the separation of pow-
ers provision in the Utah Constitution be-
cause it left no power in judges to suspend 
sentences in favor of probation. In reject-
ing this contention, we examined the histo-
ry of judicial sentencing power and deter-
mined that at common law and after state-
hood, the legislative branch possessed the 
power to fix punishment for crimes, as long 
as the punishment was not cruel or un-
usual. Id at 263-64. 
[1-3] In Bishop, 717 P.2d at 264, we 
cited with approval language from Mutart 
v. Pratt, 51 Utah 246, 170 P. 67 (1917), an 
early Utah case. In Mutart, this Court 
stated: 
That the Legislature of this state has the 
sole power to fix punishment to be in-
flicted for a particular crime, with the 
limitation only that it be not cruel or 
excessive, will not be questioned. That it 
may fix any punishment subject to the 
above limitation, and leave no discretion 
whatever in the courts as to the extent or 
degree of punishment is a well-recog-
nized and universally accepted doctrine, 
and under a statute fixing a definite peri-
od the court has no more discretion as to 
the punishment than the police officer 
whose duty it is to carry the punishment 
into effect The right of the court to 
inflict any punishment at all is given it 
by the Legislature, and without some act 
on the part of the lawmaking power no 
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such power or duty would be vested 
therein 
51 Utah at 250, 170 P. at 68. In accord 
with this principle, we reaffirm that judges 
may exercise sentencing discretion within 
those limits established by the legislature; 
the power to fix sentencing limits and the 
power to suspend sentence in favor of pro-
bation are not inherent in the judiciary but 
must be authorized by statute. Similarly, 
the power to revoke probation must be 
exercised within legislatively established 
limits. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a) 
(Interim Supp.1984) is therefore not an un-
constitutional limitation on the sentencing 
power of the judiciary. 
14] In light of the limits of judicial sen-
tencing power, we examine the statute to 
determine if the trial court exceeded its 
authority in revoking defendant's proba-
tion. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 sets forth 
probation procedures in general. At the 
time this matter arose, section 77-18-
l(10Xa) stated: 
Upon completion without violation of 18 
months probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, cr six months in 
class B misdemeanor cases, the offender 
shall be terminated from sentence and 
the supervision of the Division of Correc-
tions, unless the person is earlier termi-
nated by the court 
(Emphasis added.) Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(10Xa) (Interim Supp.1984).2 The 
statute requires that the offender "shall" 
be terminated from sentence if eighteen-
months' probation is completed without vio-
lation. This strong mandate is not consist-
ent with the State's position that the eigh-
teen-month term is "tolled" when any viola-
tion occurs within the period and that there 
2. The statute currently states: 
(7)(a) Upon completion without violation of 
18 months' probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B 
misdemeanor cases, the probation period 
shall be terminated, unless earlier terminated 
by the court 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall no-
tify the sentencing court and prosecuting at-
torney in writing 45 days in advance in ail 
cases where termination of supervision will 
occur by law. The notification shall include a 
probation progress report and complete re-
is no time limit for initiating a revocation 
action. 
The State's interpretation of the statute 
would create absurd results. Defendants 
would be left in a perpetual state of limbo; 
although their probation would appear to 
have been terminated, usually by entry of 
an order to that effect, defendants would 
actually be subject to a continued term of 
fictional supervision. This indefinite proba-
tionary term could theoretically be revoked 
many years after the original imposition 
and suspension of sentence. Decades could 
pass and then, based upon the discovery of 
a probation violation which had occurred 
during the statutory period, a court could 
revoke a term of probation thought to have 
been terminated long ago. This construc-
tion would obviate the certainty and regu-
larity created by the statute and ignore the 
plain meaning of the word "terminate.,, 
In In re Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531 
(1903), this Court examined a trial court's 
jurisdictional limits after the trial court had 
indefinitely suspended a defendant's sen-
tence and discharged him from custody. 
This Court stated: "[W]e know of no rule 
or principle of law whereby a court can 
indefinitely suspend sentence, keep the de-
fendant in a state of suspense and uncer-
tainty, and, long after he has been dis-
charged from custody, have him rearrest-
ed, and impose a sentence of either fine or 
imprisonment on him." IcL at 341, 71 P. at 
531-32. We believe the same principle de-
feats the State's arguments regarding sec-
tion 77-18-l(10)(a). 
Many other states have addressed a 
question analogous to the one raised in this 
case, i.e., whether a trial court lacks juris-
diction to revoke or amend probation after 
port of details on outstanding fines and resti-
tution orders. 
(c) At any time prior to the termination of 
probation, upon a minimum of five days' no-
tice and a hearing or upon a waiver of the 
notice and hearing by the probationer, the 
court may extend probation for an additional 
term of 18 months in felony or class A misde-
meanors or six months in class B misdemean-
ors if fines or restitution or both are owing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(7)(a) to (c) (Supp. 
1987). 
HENDERSON v. FOR-SHOR CO. 
Cite a* 737 PJtd 4*5 (UtahApp. 1988) 
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judicially invoked probationary period 
ires. In State v. Gibson, 156 NJ.Su-
. 516, 384 A.2d 178 (1978), the New 
sey Superior Court characterized the re-
ts reached by the courts of other states 
follows: (1) probation may be revoked if 
> proceedings are initiated within a rea-
lable time after the probationary term's 
piration; (2) probation may be revoked if 
i proceedings are initiated within the 
>bationary term;3 and (3) probation may 
revoked only if the proceedings are com-
eted within the probationary term. Id. at 
9-30, 384 A.2d at 184-85. None of these 
proaches has been used by a clear major-
r of jurisdictions, and each appears to be 
rgely a function of the statutory lan-
tage of each state. 
The State argues that terminating the 
>urt's jurisdiction simultaneously with the 
robation period will frustrate the public 
jlicy underlying probation, because a prob-
ationer who commits a violation has ig« 
wed the obligations set forth in the proba-
on agreement, has violated the trust asso-
rted with probation, and has endangered 
tie public. We agree that these concerns 
re valid; however, all but technical viola-
ions can be punished on their own merits, 
tnd the defendant's past record can be 
.considered at that time. 
Moreover, the current amended version 
>f section 77-18-1 does allow judges to 
*void some of the problems that may arise 
under a fixed period of jurisdiction. Pursu-
ant to section 77-18-l(7)(c), a "court may 
extend probation for an additional term . . . 
if fines or restitution or both are owing." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(7)(c) (Supp. 
1987). In the instant case, for example, 
defendant had not yet completed paying all 
of the restitution that he was ordered to 
pay, and under the current law, the trial 
court could have continued its jurisdiction 
over defendant for another eighteen-month 
term.4 
3. Because the revocation proceedings in this 
case were not initiated until after the statutory 
probation term had expired, we need not reach 
the issue of the retention of jurisdiction when 
proceedings have been initiated but not com-
pleted within the eighteen-month term. 
The trial court may also hold a hearing 
within the eighteen-month period, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(9) (Supp. 
1987), to determine whether a defendant 
has violated the terms of his or her proba-
tion. If the court determines that proba-
tion violations have in fact occurred, proba-
tion may be "revoked, modified, [or] contin-
ued, or . . . the entire probation term [may] 
commence anew/' Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(9Xe) (Supp.1987). 
The trial court's order revoking proba-
tion and authorizing execution of defend-
ant's sentence is reversed. The case is 
remanded for entry of an order terminating 
custody. 
HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate C.J., 
and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
(p fxEYNUMKISYCTUO 
Mitchell D. HENDERSON, Eileen But-
tars, Laurena B. Henderson, and David 
Hale, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
FOR-SHOR COMPANY, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 870502-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 10, 1988. 
Owner of cement forms brought action 
for conversion based on their wrongful re-
possession. Owner's grandmother, on 
whose land forms had been stored, brought 
claim for trespass. Lessee of the forms 
brought suit for rental overcharge. The 
1st District Court, Cache County, Venoy 
4. Under the statute in effect at the time of 
defendant's probation period, the trial court was 
not specifically empowered to do so. 
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in Breitling, is present here. The County 
will raise no revenue from the curbs and 
gutters, nor will it acquire a building with 
intrinsic value. Instead, it will incur the 
expenses of cleaning and maintaining curbs 
and gutters with no resale value or intrin-
sic economic worth. 
[4] Further, we think that the circum-
stances are such that it is not inequitable 
for Salt Lake County to retain whatever 
benefit it may have received from the mate-
rials delivered by Concrete Products. In-
deed, the result argued for by Concrete 
Products would be inequitable, in that it 
would turn the taxpayers of Salt Lake 
County into guarantors for all materialmen 
working on private developments and 
would subvert the intent of county ordi-
nances requiring developers to guarantee 
completion of improvements by shifting the 
burden of providing improvements from de-
velopers to taxpayers. 
In short, we can find no reason why the 
law should imply a promise on the part of 
Salt Lake County to pay Concrete Products 
for materials it delivered to a third party. 
Because we find for Salt Lake County on 
the substantive issues, we do not address 
Salt Lake County's claim that Concrete 
Products has not complied with the Govern-
mental Immunity Act. 
Reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
Costs to appellant. 
( O f KIT MUM8H SYSTEM > 
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ing one of her normal daily tasks of lifting 
computer from floor level up to conveyor 
belt, applied for workers' compensation 
benefits. The Industrial Commission de-
nied benefits. Worker appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that in-
jury of worker was compensable accident 
Reversed and remanded. 
Workers' Compensation <s=>569 
Injury of worker, who felt snap and 
tingling pain in her lower back as she was 
performing one of her normal daily tasks 
of lifting computer from floor level up to 
conveyor belt, was "accident/' for purposes 
of statute awarding compensation to em-
ployees injured by "accident" arising out of 
or in the course of their employment U.C. 
A.1953, 35-1-45. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Denton M. Hatch, Wesley M. Lang, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for 
Second Injury Fund. 
Thomas Kay, Steven J. Aeschbacher, Salt 
Lake City, for Sperry Corp. and Travelers 
Ins. Co. 
Steven M. Hadley, Salt Lake City, for 
Indus. Com'n. 
G. Carmen HERRERA, Plaintiff, 
v. 
SPERRY CORPORATION, Travelers In-
surance Company, Second Injury Fund, 
and Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Defendants. 
No. 860062. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 17, 1987. 
Worker, who felt snap and tingling 
pain in her lower back as she was perform-
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
This case is an appeal from an Industrial 
Commission ruling that an injury suffered 
by G. Carmen Herrera was not a compensa-
ble accident We reverse. 
Herrera was performing one of her nor-
mal daily tasks of lifting a computer from 
floor level up to a conveyor belt when she 
felt a snap and a tingling pain in her lower 
back. As a result of this injury, Herrera 
was unable to work for several months. 
STATE v. 
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She applied for compensation under section 
3S-1-45 of the Code, U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-
45 (1974 ed., Supp.1986), which states: 
"Every employee . . . who is injured . . . by 
accident arising out of or in the course of 
his employment . . . shall be paid . . . com-
pensation— " 
The Industrial Commission of Utah ruled 
that the injury was not an "accident" be-
cause Herrera suffered her injury while 
performing her usual daily tasks in the 
usual manner. Herrera appeals the deci-
sion of the Industrial Commission. She 
contends that unexpected injuries incurred 
while performing one's usual duties are 
compensable "accidents" if there is a caus-
al connection between the injury and the 
worker's employment duties. 
After this appeal was argued, we decided 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 
15 (Utah 1986). There, we held that "an 
accident is an unexpected or unintended 
occurrence that may be either the cause or 
the result of an injury." Id. at 22 (empha-
sis in original). Under this definition, 
Herrera's injury was an "accident" 
Whether she is entitled to compensation 
depends on her satisfying the other ele-
ments set out in Allen. We reverse and 
remand for further considenition in light of 
Allen. 
HALL, C.J., STEWART, Associate 
CJ., and HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., 
concur. 
(o | HY NUMBI* SYSTEM > 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Johnnie Patrick KNIGHT, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 20670. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 19, 1987. 
Defendant was convicted of aggrava-
ted robbery by a jury in the Third District 
734 P 2d—21 
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Court, Salt Lake County, David B. Dee, J., 
and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Zim-
merman, J., held that prosecution's failure 
to comply with discovery agreement by om-
itting correct addresses and telephone num-
bers of two potential witnesses and state-
ments taken from those witnesses was 
prejudicial error. 
Reversed. 
1. Criminal Law e=>627.8(3) 
Failure to properly request a court or-
der for criminal discovery of items falling 
within catchall provision of discovery stat-
ute could be fatal to claim based on nondis-
closure of evidence. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-
16(aX5). 
2. Criminal Law <s=>627.8(l, 6) 
When prosecution responds voluntarily 
to request for discovery, prosecution either 
must produce all the materials requested or 
identify explicitly those portions of the re-
quest with respect to which no responsive 
material will be provided and must contin-
ue to disclose such material to the defense 
on an ongoing basis. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-
16. 
3. Criminal Law <s=>627.5(l) 
If prosecution agrees to produce cer-
tain specified material and it later comes 
into possession of additional material that 
falls within that same specification, it has 
to produce the later-acquired material. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-16. 
4. Criminal Law <£=>700(6) 
Prosecutor's unconditional agreement 
to produce statements in possession of any 
member or group involved in prosecution 
or investigation of case obliged him to 
search beyond his own file cabinet and 
determine whether others involved in pros-
ecution had additional materials responsive 
to the request 
5. Criminal Law <s=>627.8(6) 
Prosecutor's good faith in complying 
with unconditional agreement to produce 
914 Utah 734 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
materials sought by defense should not 
have had any impact on trial court's deter-
mination of whether prosecutor violated his 
discovery duties. 
6. Criminal Law <s=»1166(10.10) 
For error in response to prosecutor's 
violation of his discovery duties to require 
reversal, likelihood of a different outcome 
must be sufficiently high to undermine con-
fidence in the verdict, such that there was 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for the defendant but for the prose-
cution's violations of discovery duties. 
7. Criminal Law <S=>1163(1) 
In cases involving wrongful failure to 
disclose inculpatory evidence, State has the 
burden of persuading the court that the 
error did not unfairly prejudice the defense 
and there was no reasonable likelihood 
that, absent the error, the outcome of the 
trial would have been more favorable for 
the defendant. 
8. Criminal Law <s=>1163(l) 
In case involving wrongful failure to 
disclose inculpatory evidence, State may 
meet burden of persuading court that error 
did not unfairly prejudice defendant by 
showing that, despite errors, the outcome 
of the trial merited confidence and that 
there was no reasonable likelihood of more 
favorable result for defendant. 
9. Criminal Law 0=627.8(6), 629 
The fact that defense counsel conduct-
ed vigorous cross-examination of two wit-
nesses was not proof that she was fully 
prepared to meet witnesses' testimony, for 
purposes of determining whether defense 
was prejudiced by State's failure to dis-
close addresses and telephone number of 
witnesses and statements given by them to 
prosecution. 
10. Criminal Law <3»627.8(6), 629, 
1166(10.10, 11) 
Prosecution's failure to disclose ad-
dresses and telephone numbers of prospec-
tive witnesses pursuant to consent agree-
ment and to disclose contents of statement 
to police prejudiced defendant where testi-
mony of those witnesses was pivotal to 
defendant's conviction, and additional evi-
dence against defendant was not over-
whelming, especially given codefendant's 
acquittal. 
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Sandra 
L. Sjogren, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and respondent 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Defendant Johnnie Patrick Knight ap-
peals from a jury conviction on a charge of 
aggravated robbery. Knight contends that 
during discovery, the prosecution assumed 
the obligation to provide defense counsel 
with certain requested information, includ-
ing the correct addresses and telephone 
numbers of two potential witnesses and 
statements taken from those witnesses by 
an investigator. Knight complains that the 
prosecutor did not fulfill this obligation and 
that as a result, Knight's ability to defend 
was impaired because the two witnesses 
appeared at trial and gave unanticipated 
testimony. Knight further argues that the 
prejudice to his defense was not mitigated 
as it should have been because the trial 
court denied his motions for a continuance 
or a mistrial. We agree and reverse the 
conviction. 
On February 2, 1984, the One Hour Mar-
tinizing Cleaners located at 1689 South 
West Temple Street in Salt Lake City was 
robbed of approximately $85.50. Two 
masked men carrying weapons entered the 
establishment through the employees' en-
trance, forced the manager to lie on the 
floor, and compelled an employee to open 
the cash register. After removing the 
money from the till, the men took the man-
ager's checkbook and wallet, cut the tele-
phone cord, and fled. 
The manager and the employee were not 
able to describe the robbers' facial charac-
teristics because the faces were almost en-
tirely covered. However, the employee 
was able to describe to investigators a man 
who had entered the establishment shortly 
before the robbery. The man stayed for 
only a moment and glanced around the 
STATE v. 
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store while he asked for directions. 
Through a police photo lineup, the employ-
ee identified this man as Jeff Richens. 
Immediately after the robbery, a motor-
ist saw the robbers running out of the One 
Hour Martinizing Cleaners. The motorist 
followed in his car as the men ran down the 
middle of West Temple Street and then 
down an alley to a getaway car with a 
waiting driver. The motorist copied the 
license number of the car and noticed that 
the driver had long hair. The license num-
ber was turned over to police investigators 
who quickly located the car, which was 
parked on a roadside in West Valley City. 
The car was registered to Kim Richens, 
Jeff Richens' wife. 
With Kim Richens' permission, investiga-
tors searched the car and found several 
items linking the car to the robbery. In 
the trunk of the car, they also found a 
wallet belonging to Johnnie Knight, along 
with some clothing, tools, and animal traps. 
When police investigators questioned 
Knight, he explained that he left his wallet 
in the trunk after a trapping excursion 
with Jeff Richens. Knight also stated that 
at the time of the robbery, he was with 
Georgia Moore, drinking coffee in her 
kitchen. Upon questioning, Georgia Moore 
corroborated Knight's story, and the wallet 
was returned to its owner, 
Jeff Richens also was interviewed. Ri-
chens admitted involvement in the robbery 
and agreed to testify for the State. He 
pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of at-
tempted robbery. Richens' story was that 
Johnnie Knight and Joseph Ridlon were the 
two masked robbers who carried weapons 
and that he was the driver of the car. 
Knight and Ridlon were charged with 
aggravated robbery. At trial, they were 
co-defendants represented by separate 
counsel Pursuant to Rule 16(aX5) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A., 
1953, § 77-35-16(a)(5) (1982 ed.), counsel 
for Knight filed a written motion request-
ing that the trial court order the prosecu-
tion to disclose certain specified items and 
information, including the addresses and 
telephone numbers of the State's potential 
witnesses and any statements taken from 
KNIGHT Utah 915 
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them. A hearing on the motion was sched-
uled, but prior to the date of that hearing, 
the prosecutor agreed to comply voluntar-
ily with the discovery request. The trial 
court cancelled the hearing and did not 
issue a discovery order. 
In preparing to respond to the discovery 
request, the prosecutor assumed that all 
information pertaining to the case was lo-
cated in his files. As a result, he did not 
check the files of other members of the 
prosecution team, and when providing the 
defense with the requested material, he did 
not indicate that he had not checked others' 
files. 
The prosecutor's response listed Georgia 
Moore and her estranged husband, Walter 
Moore, among the witnesses the State in-
tended to call. The prosecutor did not dis-
close that any statements had been taken 
from the Moores. He did list addresses 
and telephone numbers for the Moores, but 
they were not current. A few days before 
trial, defense counsel asked the prosecutor 
whether he had discovered the Moores' cur-
rent addresses and telephone numbers. 
The prosecutor truthfully responded that 
his subpoenas had been returned unserved 
and that he had been unable to locate the 
Moores. However, within a day or two the 
prosecutor managed to contact the Moores 
(one of whom was living out of the state) 
and arranged for them to attend trial and 
testify. As a result of this contact, the 
prosecutor obtained correct addresses and 
telephone numbers for the Moores. These 
were not given to defense counsel prior to 
trial 
On the first day of the two-day trial, 
defense counsel learned that an investiga-
tor for the State, Sergeant Adamson, had 
taken statements from both of the Moores 
months before trial and that the statements 
had lain in Adamson's files ever since. 
That evening, defense counsel obtained 
copies of the statements. Their substance 
was as follows: 
(i) According to the statement given to 
Adamson by Georgia Moore, Knight had 
asked her to be his alibi for a robbery he 
was accused of but did not commit, and 
she had agreed. However, at the time of 
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the interview with Adamson, Georgia 
Moore said that she was tired of lying 
and that Knight was not in her kitchen at 
the time of the robbery. 
(ii) According to Walter Moore's state-
ment to Adamson, Knight telephoned 
him shortly after the time of the robbery 
and asked him to pick up Knight and a 
friend because they were having car 
trouble. Walter Moore picked up Knight 
and Richens and the three then drove 
past Richens' car (the getaway car), 
which was parked on a roadside in West 
Valley City. 
At the opening of trial on the second day, 
defense counsel made appropriate objec-
tions to the Moores' testifying, moved for 
mistrial, requested a continuance, and at-
tempted to withdraw as counsel. The trial 
court denied all motions. Both Georgia 
and Walter Moore were allowed to testify, 
and defense counsel was not given any 
additional time to meet the unanticipated 
testimony. Knight was convicted of aggra-
vated robbery, while co-defendant Ridlon 
was acquitted. 
This appeal presents two questions: 
first, whether the State's failure to disclose 
the Moores' statements, addresses, and 
telephone numbers was error; second, if 
error was committed, whether defendant 
suffered prejudice sufficient to warrant re-
versal. 
The starting place for analyzing the pro-
priety of the prosecutor's conduct is de-
fendant's motion to discover. That motion 
sought, inter alia, the following: 
A. A list of ail the witnesses that the 
State intends to call for trial in the 
above-entitled matter, their addresses 
and telephone numbers; 
B. Any recordings, reports, tran-
scripts, or reports about statements in 
possession of any member, or group in-
volved in the prosecution or the investi-
gation of the above-entitled case taken 
from the witnesses listed in point [A] 
above. 
1. Failure to properly request a court order un-
der section 77-35-16(a)(5) may be fatal to a 
claim based on the nondisclosure of evidence. 
See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342. 346 (Utah 
The prosecutor's obligation to comply 
with this request for discovery must be 
evaluated under Rule 16 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, which states in per-
tinent part 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the 
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense 
upon request the following material or 
information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) Relevant written or recorded state-
ments of the defendant or co-defendants; 
(2) The criminal record of the defend-
ant; 
(3) Physical evidence seized from the 
defendant or co-defendant; 
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor 
that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defend-
ant, or mitigate the degree of the offense 
for reduced punishment; and 
(5) Any other item of evidence which 
the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the 
defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-16 (1982 ed.) (empha-
sis added). 
[1-3] Where, as here, the requested ma-
terial is not covered by the detailed descrip-
tions in subsections (a)(1) through (aX4), 
which mandate disclosure upon request, 
subsection (a)(5), the catch-all provision, ap-
plies. It requires disclosure of the material 
sought only to the extent ordered by the 
trial court.1 However, when the prosecu-
tion chooses to respond voluntarily to a 
request under subsection (a)(5) without re-
quiring the defense to obtain a court order, 
considerations of fairness require that the 
prosecution respond to the request in a 
manner that will not be misleading. There-
fore, we articulate two requirements that 
the prosecution must meet when it re-
sponds voluntarily to a request for dis-
covery. First, the prosecution either must 
produce all of the material requested or 
must identify explicitly those portions of 
the request with respect to which no re-
1985); cf. State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49. 53 
(Utah 1981) (failure to exercise reasonable dil-
igence in conducting discovery tends to negate a 
claim that nondisclosure was erroneous). 
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sponsive material will be provided. Sec-
ond, when the prosecution agrees to pro-
duce any of the material requested, it must 
continue to disclose such material on an 
ongoing basis to the defense. Therefore, if 
the prosecution agrees to produce certain 
specified material and it later comes into 
possession of additional material that falls 
within that same specification, it has to 
produce the later-acquired material.2 
Some discussion of the rationale behind 
these two requirements is warranted. 
With respect to the first—that the govern-
ment produce everything requested or iden-
tify the material not being provided—the 
observations of the United States Supreme 
Court in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 
667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), 
are instructive, although they dealt with 
neither the type of evidence involved in this 
case nor Utah's discovery statute0 
The Government notes that an incom-
plete response to a specific request not 
only deprives the defense of certain evi-
dence, but has the effect of representing 
to the defense that the evidence does not 
exist In reliance on this misleading rep-
resentation, the defense might abandon 
lines of independent investigation, de-
fenses, or trial strategies that it other-
wise would have pursued. 
We agree that the prosecutor's failure 
to respond fully to a . . . request may 
impair the adversary process in this man-
ner. 
Id. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3384 (citation omit-
ted). 
For the misleading-the-defense rationale 
to apply, the discovery request must be 
sufficiently specific to permit the prosecu-
tion to understand what is sought and to 
justify the parallel assumption on the part 
of the defense that material not produced 
does not exist. Id. at 682-83, 105 S.Ct. at 
2. Absent such a requirement, defense counsel 
would have to submit frequent requests to the 
prosecution to be sure that all pertinent materi-
al had been produced. No practical purpose 
would be served by imposing such a burden--
some requirement on the defense. Moreover, 
great potential for game-playing between the 
prosecution and the defense is inherent in a 
discovery system that lacks a continuing obli-
gation to disclose. 
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3384-85; see, e.g., State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d 
751, 752 (Utah 1984); cf. State v. Booker, 
709 P.2d 342, 346 (Utah 1985). The request 
in the present case specifically and unmis-
takably sought disclosure of subsection 
(a)(5) material consisting of the names and 
addresses of witnesses and their state-
ments. The prosecution clearly understood 
what was requested and agreed to provide 
all that it had. 
The second requirement—that there be a 
continuing obligation to disclose material 
falling within the scope of the agreement 
to produce—is not a novel requirement, but 
is a specific application of a burden we 
imposed on the government in State v. 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985). There, 
we observed that a prosecutor has a con-
tinuing obligation to reveal newly discover-
ed evidence that fits within the scope of 
prior disclosures. This obligation was im-
posed to make criminal discovery a fair 
process. In Carter, we stated: 
To meet basic standards of fairness and 
to insure that a trial is a real quest for 
truth and not simply a contest between 
the parties to win, a defendant's request 
for information which has been voluntar-
ily complied with, or a court order of 
discovery must be deemed to be a con-
tinuing request. And even though there 
is no court-ordered disclosure, a prosecu-
tor's failure to disclose newly discovered 
inculpatory information which falls 
with[in] the ambit of § 77-35-16(a), after 
the prosecution has made a voluntary 
disclosure of evidence might so mislead 
defendant as to cause prejudicial error. 
Id. at 662.3 
[4,5] In the present case, the prosecu-
tor's conduct plainly did not satisfy either 
of the two requirements set forth above. 
First, he did not notify defense counsel of 
3. The requirements imposed in Carter and the 
present case not only ensure that a trial is a real 
quest for truth, but also should increase confi-
dence in informal discovery procedures by mak-
ing the obligations of the parties more certain 
and thereby should reduce the need for court-
ordered discovery in an already-burdened crimi-
nal justice system. 
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the limited nature of his response to the 
request for production. The defense re-
quested "statements in possession of any 
member, or group involved in the prosecu-
tion or the investigation of the above-enti-
tled case.'1 The prosecutor agreed to pro-
vide the materials sought, but he furnished 
only the information found in his own files. 
He did not determine whether others "in-
volved in the prosecution or the investiga-
tion" of the case had additional materials 
responsive to the request Given the ex-
plicit language of the request, there is no 
question that the prosecutor's uncondition-
al agreement to produce obliged him to 
search beyond his own file cabinet.4 He 
did not do so, and he did not inform de-
fense counsel of that fact.5 
The second requirement also was violat-
ed because the prosecutor did not provide 
defense counsel with after-acquired infor-
mation responsive to the request, specifi-
cally, the current addresses and telephone 
numbers of the Moores. 
Having determined that the prosecutor 
violated his discovery duties, the next ques-
tion is whether the trial court erred in 
refusing to grant any of the relief sought 
by defense counsel after the violation was 
brought to its attention. Rule 16(g) pro-
vides: 
4. The facts of this case illustrate the value of 
written requests for production and of carefully 
drawn responses. Had the prosecutor drafted a 
response to exclude information in other files, 
the defense could not have been misled by his 
nonproduction of the Moores' statements. On 
the other hand, had defense counsel been in-
formed that the prosecution would not voluntar-
ily produce requested material, she could have 
taken steps to seek an* order compelling produc-
tion. 
5. Before the trial court, the prosecutor argued 
that he had acted in good faith with regard to 
the Moores' statements. He explained that he 
had assumed responsibility for the case after the 
previous prosecutor was transferred and that 
during discovery he had acted under the as-
sumption that all information pertaining to the 
case was in the files that were given to him. 
Before this Court, the State does not explicitly 
assert that the prosecutor's good faith is a de-
fense to the claim of error. 
The prosecutor's good faith should not have 
had any impact on the trial court's determina-
If at any time during the course of the 
proceedings it is brought to the attention 
of the court that a party has failed to 
comply with this rule, the court may 
order such party to permit the discovery 
or inspection, grant a continuance, or 
prohibit the party from introducing evi-
dence not disclosed, or it may enter such 
other order as it deems just under the 
circumstances. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-16(g) (1982 ed.). Un-
der this rule, the trial court has ample 
power to obviate any prejudice resulting 
from a breach of the criminal discovery 
rules. If it does so, the defendant obvious-
ly cannot complain of the prosecutor's con-
duct, since the defendant's substantial 
rights will not have been affected. See 
Utah R.Crim.P. 30 (codified in U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 77-35-30(a) (1982 ed.)). 
On the other hand, if the trial judge 
denies the relief requested under Rule 
16(g), that denial may constitute an abuse 
of discretion warranting a reversal. An 
abuse of discretion occurs when, taking 
into account any remedial measures or-
dered by the trial court, the prejudice to 
the defendant still satisfies the standard 
for reversible error set forth in Rule 30, 
and the remedial measures requested but 
refused would have obviated this prejudice. 
tion of whether the prosecutor had violated his 
discovery duties. In State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 
785 (Utah 1984), this Court stated: 
At the outset, we stress that we are con-
cerned with more than the prosecutor's state 
of knowledge Information known to po-
lice officers working on the case is charged to 
the prosecution since the officers are part of 
the prosecution team. Neither the prosecutor 
nor officers working on a case may withhold 
exculpatory evidence or evidence valuable to 
a defendant. 
. . . [T]he good or bad faith of the prosecu-
tor is irrelevant. 
Id at 788 (citations omitted). While constitu-
tional principles imposed the duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence in Shabata, whereas the 
duty to disclose inculpatory evidence in the in-
stant case was assumed voluntarily, the princi-
ple stated in Shabata is applicable here: infor-
mation known to any part of ihe prosecution 
team is charged to the prosecutor, and the pros-
ecutor's good faith ignorance does not excuse 
nondisclosure. If any weight were given to 
good faith ignorance, it would only encourage 
after-the-fact justifications for nondisclosure. 
STATE v. 
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In the present case, the trial court denied 
all requested relief, including defendant's 
motions for a continuance and for a mis-
trial, either of which would have mitigated 
the prejudice he suffered.6 Whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying 
those motions therefore depends entirely 
upon a determination of whether the prose-
cutor's failure to produce the requested 
information resulted in prejudice sufficient 
to warrant reversal under Rule 30. 
Rule 30 states: "Any error, defect, irreg-
ularity or variance which does not affect 
the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded." U.C.A., 1953, § 77-3S-30 
(1982 ed.). The meaning of this standard is 
not entirely clear from our cases. We have 
ruled in several cases that the Rule 30 
phrase "affect the substantial rights of a 
party" means that an error warrants rever-
sal "only if a review of the record per-
suades the court that without the error 
there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result for the defendant.' " 
State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 
(Utah 1984) (quoting State v. Hutchison, 
655 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1982) (emphasis 
added)); see also State v. Velarde, 734 
P.2d 440 (1986).T And we have applied this 
rule in cases involving nondisclosures by 
the prosecution. See State v. Schreuder, 
6. The fact that a motion for relief under Rule 
16(g) was made is significant under our deci-
sions in State v. Workman,, 635 ?2d 49, 53 
(Utah 1981) (defendant's failure to seek a con-
tinuance tends to negate claimed element of 
surprise), and State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 
275-76 (Utah 1985) (defendant's claim of preju-
dice was precluded in part because he did not 
give the trial court an opportunity to avoid or to 
mitigate the prejudice resulting from the non-
disclosure). 
7. We are dealing here with the outcome of trial, 
not the outcome of plea bargaining. A separate 
point defendant raises on appeal is that he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel during 
plea bargaining. He reasons that counsel could 
not advise him effectively as to the wisdom of 
accepting or rejecting plea bargain offers with-
out the information that was withheld by the 
prosecution. 
We have previously rejected claims alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel when a defend-
ant has rejected a plea bargain and has retained 
his or her right to a fair trial. For example, in 
State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985), 
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712 P.2d 264, 275-76 (Utah 1985) (defend-
ant failed to show a "reasonable probabili-
ty" that the undisclosed evidence would 
have affected the outcome of trial). In 
other cases involving nondisclosure, our 
statements of the standard have been less 
precise. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 
(Utah 1985) (failure to disclose evidence did 
not so mislead defendant as to cause preju-
dicial error); State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 
49, 53 (Utah 1981) (surprise testimony was 
without prejudicial effect). We think that 
the "reasonable likelihood" standard set 
forth in Fontana, Hutchison, Velarde, and 
Schreuder best explains Rule 30's test for 
reversible error. In light of our inconsist-
ent expressions of this standard in the 
past, we will take this opportunity to flesh 
out the meaning of the phrase "reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result." 
If we assume a spectrum of probabilities 
with zero percent at one end representing 
no likelihood of a different result and one 
hundred percent at the other end represent-
ing absolute certainty of a different result, 
we can array verbalizations of probabilities 
across that spectrum. A "mere possibili-
ty" is at the low end of the spectrum, "near 
certainty" is at the high end, and "more 
probable than not" is a likelihood greater 
than fifty percent. Of course, we cannot 
we stated: "[Defendant] loses sight of the fact 
that our state and federal constitutions guaran-
tee fair trials, not plea bargains." 
At most, the cases cited by defendant lend 
indirect support to the proposition that the State 
cannot enforce a defendant's guilty plea and 
consequent waiver of his right to a fair trial if 
he has been denied effective assistance of coun-
sel in deciding whether to waive his rights. 
North Carolina v. Atford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 
160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (individual accused 
of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and 
understanding^ consent to imposition of a pris-
on sentence even if he or she is unwilling to 
admit participation in the acts constituting the 
crime); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 
363, 98 S.Ct 663, 667, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) 
(defendants advised by competent counsel are 
presumptively capable of intelligent choice in 
pleading guilty); see also State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 
1294, 1299 (Utah 1986) (defendant must act 
freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge 
when he or she pleads guilty and thereby waives 
important constitutional rights). In this case, 
defendant did not waive his right to a fair trial 
by pleading guilty as did the defendants in Al-
ford, Bordenkircher, and Kay. 
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assign a definite spot on the spectrum to 
the term "reasonable likelihood," but we 
can give some guidance to the lower courts 
and counsel as to where a "reasonable like-
lihood" should fall. 
In defining a similarly worded standard, 
the United States Supreme Court has stat-
ed: "A reasonable probability is a probabil-
ity sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome."8 Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Unit-
ed States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 
3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) {Strickland 
articulation of the reasonable probability 
standard applied in a case involving nondis-
closure of impeachment evidence). Al-
though the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of "reasonable probability" 
is not binding on this Court when constru-
ing state criminal rules, we are persuaded 
that defining the substantively identical 
term "reasonable likelihood" by reference 
to a reviewing court's confidence in the 
outcome of trial makes good sense in deter-
mining whether reversible error has oc-
curred. Rules that govern criminal pro-
ceedings are meant to ensure that a trial is 
a search for truth and that the verdict 
merits confidence. It is entirely consistent 
with this aim to require that when error 
has eroded a reviewing court's confidence 
in the outcome of a particular trial, we 
should start over and conduct a new trial. 
[6] The erosion-of-confidence criterion 
gives substance to the more theoretical 
"reasonable likelihood" standard. It thus 
assists us in determining where on the 
spectrum of outcome probabilities dis-
cussed earlier "reasonable likelihood" 
might appear. For an error to require 
reversal, the likelihood of a different out-
come must be sufficiently high to under-
mine confidence in the verdict This is 
8, Language in State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 
1205 (Utah 1984), indicates that the "reasonable 
probability* standard is somewhat lower than 
the "reasonable likelihood" standard; on reflec-
tion, this statement appears wrong. The words 
"likelihood" and "probability," as used in these 
error-measuring standards, are synonymous, 
and the two standards have been used inter-
changeably by this Court. See State v. Pierre, 
572 P.2d 1338, 1352 (Utah 1977), cert denied, 
certainly above the "mere possibility" point 
on the spectrum. If it is "more probable 
than not" that the outcome of trial would 
have been different, then a court cannot 
possibly place confidence in the verdict 
Furthermore, thoughtful reflection sug-
gests that confidence in the outcome may 
be undermined at some point substantially 
short of the "more probable than not" por-
tion of the spectrum. It may not be possi-
ble to define "reasonable likelihood" much 
more explicitly than this, but the foregoing 
should be of some assistance in deciding 
whether an error requires reversal. 
Applying Rule 30 to the prosecutor's vio-
lations of his discovery duties, we must 
determine whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the outcome of Knight's tri-
al would have been more favorable to him 
had the prosecution revealed the requested 
material. This determination normally is 
based upon a review of the record. State 
v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 
1984). If taken literally, this review proce-
dure would require us to determine from 
the record what evidence would have been 
before the jury absent the error. How-
ever, when, as here, the error consists of 
the prosecution's failure to provide a de-
fendant with inculpatory evidence, the 
record does not provide much assistance in 
discovering the nature or magnitude of the 
resulting prejudice to the defense. The 
record cannot reveal how knowledge of this 
evidence would have affected the actions of 
defense counsel, either in preparing for 
trial or in presenting the case to the jury. 
To a large extent, this leaves the reviewing 
court to speculate whether, absent the er-
ror, there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
defense would have adduced other evidence 
which, when considered in light of the evi-
dence actually presented, would have pro-
439 VS. 882, 99 S.Ct. 219, 58 L.Ed.2d 194 (1978) 
("error must be such that there exists a reason-
able probability or likelihood that there would 
have been a result more favorable to the defend-
ant in absence of the error" (emphasis added)). 
Compare State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 
(Utah 1984) ("reasonable likelihood" standard). 
with State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 275-76 
(Utah 1985) ("reasonable probability" standard). 
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duced a reasonable doubt as to the defend-
ant's guilt 
[7] Because of the difficulties posed by 
the record's silence in cases involving a 
wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory evi-
dence, it seems appropriate in such instanc-
es to place the burden on the State to 
persuade a court that the error did not 
unfairly prejudice the defense. Therefore, 
when the defendant can make a credible 
argument that the prosecutor's errors have 
impaired the defense, it is up to the State 
to persuade the court that there is no rea-
sonable likelihood that absent the error, the 
outcome of trial would have been more 
favorable for the defendant. 
In the present case, the defense makes 
several arguments in support of its claim 
that the defense was impaired. First, be-
cause of the prosecutor's representations 
before trial that he was unable to locate 
the Moores and his failure to disclose the 
Moores' correct addresses and telephone 
numbers when he obtained them, the de-
fense had no opportunity to contact the 
Moores and had no reason to expect that 
they would be present to testify. As far as 
the defense knew, Richens was the main 
witness against Knight and the focus of 
the trial would be on Richens' credibility. 
Defendant claims that this erroneous focus 
profoundly influenced defense counsel's 
pretrial strategy and trial preparation. 
Second, even if the defense should have 
expected the Moores to testify because 
they were listed as possible witnesses, the 
prosecutor's failure to respond fully to the 
discovery request left the defense unaware 
of the existence and content of the state-
ments that the prosecution had taken from 
the Moores. This, defendant contends, im-
paired his counsel's ability to prepare to 
meet the Moores' testimony. 
We cannot determine with any certainty 
from the record whether, absent the prose-
cutor's nondisclosures, the defense would 
have been better prepared to meet the 
Moores' testimony. However, the conten-
tion that the defense was caught off-guard 
and was denied sufficient time to explore 
ways of meeting the Moores' testimony 
rings true, and we certainly cannot say 
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that advance notice would not have led to 
the introduction of other evidence that 
would have undermined their statements. 
Moreover, as we discuss below, the Moores' 
testimony was apparently pivotal to the 
jury's conviction of Knight and acquittal of 
Ridlon. Given the centrality of this testi-
mony, the possible denial of adequate op-
portunity to meet it assumes heightened 
importance when evaluating whether the 
defense might have been impaired. 
[8] Having thus weighed these argu-
ments, we conclude that defendant has 
presented a credible argument that his de-
fense was impaired. Therefore, the State 
must bear the burden of persuading us 
that the error was not prejudicial. It can 
meet this burden by showing that despite 
the errors, the outcome of trial merits con-
fidence and there is no reasonable likeli-
hood of a more favorable result for defend-
ant In State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 
(Utah 1985), for example, the prosecutor 
failed to disclose that the victim had seen 
the defendant near the scene of the burgla-
ry. Although the nondisclosure was error, 
the State convinced this Court that the 
nondisclosure did not significantly mislead 
the defendant during trial preparation. Id. 
at 662. This Court also was convinced that 
the undisclosed evidence was not crucial to 
the prosecution's case because other sub-
stantial evidence tied the defendant to the 
burglary. Id. 
In the present case, the State attempts to 
show that the errors were not prejudicial. 
Here, in contrast to Carter, we find the 
State's arguments unpersuasive. The 
State's first argument is based on the fol-
lowing facts: Sometime after Georgia 
Moore talked to investigators and corrobo-
rated Knight's alibi story, the Knights and 
the Moores had a falling out The two 
families came into conflict while living to-
gether in a one-family house. The Moores 
moved out, and when they came to pick up 
their belongings, certain items—guns, a mi-
crowave, welding equipment, and tools— 
were missing. The Moores accused defend-
ant Johnnie Knight of stealing these 
things. The conflict escalated, and Georgia 
Moore wrote a letter to Knight in which 
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she stated: "You not only steal from 
friends, you continue to screw them time 
after time. John, Kenny's back at the 
pointp9*] You'll be seeing him soon. Say 
hi for me." Following this conflict, Geor-
gia Moore was listed as one of the State's 
witnesses. 
Based on these facts, the State argues 
that the defense could not have been genu-
inely surprised that Georgia Moore no long-
er intended to corroborate Knight's alibi 
story. The State's argument can be re-
stated in this way: Defense counsel had 
ample opportunity to consult with Knight 
concerning the fact that he had asked Geor-
gia Moore to provide him with an alibi and 
to lie to investigators, and defense counsel 
could not have expected Georgia Moore to 
continue to lie for Knight after the dispute, 
especially when she was listed as a witness 
for the State. 
We find this argument unpersuasive be 
cause it presumes that Georgia Moore's 
testimony at trial was true. If Georgia 
Moore concocted the events described in 
her testimony to hurt Knight, then—absent 
disclosure of her statement—the defense 
had no way of knowing what she would say 
and could not prepare to meet it. In addi-
tion, the defense may have supposed that 
the State was listing Georgia Moore as a 
possible credibility or character witness (in 
case Knight took the stand) and that she 
would testify as to the events surrounding 
the dispute between the families. 
[9] The State's second argument is that 
Knight was not prejudiced because defense 
counsel was prepared to meet the testimo-
ny of the Moores. For this proposition, the 
State relies upon the fact that defense 
counsel did cross-examine the Moores vig-
orously and attempted to show that they 
had a motive to lie because of the earlier 
disagreement between the Moores and 
Knight The fact that defense counsel con-
ducted vigorous cross-examination is not 
proof that she was fully prepared to meet 
the Moores' testimony. We do not know 
what additional impeachment evidence 
might have been submitted to the jury if 
9. The term "the point" is short for "the point of 
the mountain," a term which is used to refer to 
the defense had seen the Moores' state-
ments before trial and had prepared to 
discredit the specific allegations in the 
statements. We cannot presume that the 
events at trial would have been unaffected. 
For example, if evidence had been ob-
tained demonstrating that Walter Moore 
was out of town on the day of the robbery, 
this evidence would have entirely discred-
ited his testimony. But if defendant had 
no pretrial indication as to the nature of 
Walter Moore's testimony, then there was 
no reason for defendant to attempt to lo-
cate such evidence. Since defense counsel 
only had one evening and a lunch break to 
prepare to meet the Moores' testimony, we 
are not persuaded that the defense was as 
effective as it would have been if defense 
counsel had been granted a continuance to 
meet the undisclosed evidence. 
The State's third argument is based on 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985). 
The State contends that even if the Moores' 
testimony was a surprise, defendant was 
not significantly prejudiced by it because 
other substantial testimony tied defendant 
to the robbery. Specifically, the State re-
lies on the facts that an accomplice's testi-
mony implicated Knight and that Knight's 
billfold was found in the trunk of the car. 
We disagree. 
The Moores' testimony was crucial to the 
prosecution's case. Richens testified that 
he, Ridlon, and Knight committed the rob-
bery, thereby equally implicating the two 
co-defendants in the crime. Evidently, Ri-
chens' testimony alone was insufficient to 
convince the jury of the co-defendants' 
guilt, because Ridlon was acquitted. The 
State introduced additional evidence 
against Knight, and Knight was convicted. 
The first piece of additional evidence 
against Knight was the fact that his wallet 
was found in the trunk of the getaway car, 
along with some tools, clothing, and animal 
traps. It is unlikely that Knight would 
have been convicted if the wallet had been 
the only evidence against him other than 
Richens' testimony. Richens testified that 
a gap in the Traverse Mountains near which the 
Utah State Prison is located. 
STATE v. 
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before the date of the robbery, he and 
Knight had gone trapping together on sev-
eral occasions and left their wallets in the 
car while trapping. 
The other additional evidence against 
Knight was the testimony of the Moores. 
If the jury believed Georgia Moore's testi-
mony, then Knight, by setting up an alibi, 
was trying to hide the truth about his 
actions during the time of the robbery. If 
Walter Moore's testimony was believed by 
the jury, then Knight was with Richens and 
the getaway car shortly after the time of 
the robbery. This testimony corroborated 
Richens' testimony and tied Knight to the 
crime. 
In addition, the Moores' testimony 
brought another force into play against 
Knight. As a result of the Moores' testi-
mony at trial, counsel for his co-defendant, 
Ridlon, decided to change his theory of the 
case. Halfway through the trial, Ridlon's 
counsel informed Knight's counsel that in 
his closing argument he would attempt to 
persuade the jury that Richens and Knight 
robbed the cleaners and that a woman was 
driving the car, a woman whom Richens 
was trying to protect by implicating Rid-
lon.10 During closing argument, Ridlon's 
counsel argued this theory to the jury and, 
in doing so, emphasized the evidence other 
than Richens' testimony tying Knight to 
10. The prejudice to defendant's pretrial strategy 
has already been mentioned. Knight's counsel 
argues that if the statements had been disclosed 
when requested, she would not have been sur-
prised by co-defendant's changed strategy and 
would have moved for a severance five days in 
advance of trial, as required by Rule 9(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 77-35-9(d) (1982 ed.). It docs appear that the 
prejudice to Knight resulting from co-defend-
ant's argument that Knight was a guilty party 
KNIGHT Utah 923 
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the crime, particularly the Moores* testimo-
ny. 
[10] It is apparent that the Moores' tes-
timony was pivotal in Knight's conviction. 
The State cannot argue that the Moores 
were unimportant witnesses or that their 
testimony was not crucial to the prosecu-
tion's case against Knight. Given co-de-
fendant Ridlon's acquittal, there is a high 
likelihood that Knight would not have been 
convicted in the absence of the Moores' 
testimony. 
Because the State has failed to persuade 
us that the defense was not prejudiced by 
its nondisclosure of the inculpatory evi-
dence, we conclude that absent the prosecu-
tor's errors, there is a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable result for defendant 
Therefore, the trial court abused its discre-
tion in denying defendant's motion for a 
continuance or mistrial.11 The conviction is 
reversed. 
HALL, CJ., STEWART, A.CJ., and 
HOWE and DURHAM, JJ„ concur. 
(o |XEYNUM8I«SYSTEM> 
could have been avoided by separate trials. 
However, we need not reach the issue of wheth-
er it would have been error for the trial court to 
deny a motion for severance. The issue will not 
be raised on remand because co-defendant Rid-
lon was acquitted. 
11. The remaining issues raised by defendant are 
of no merit. 
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of Divorce and Orders," dated February 5, 
1988, was a final order, for purposes of filing 
an appeal. We do not agree. The Consolidated 
Decree of Divorce and Orders merely reiter-
ated what the court had previously ordered in 
several different orders, referred to those 
orders specifically by date in most instances, 
and joined them in one document, as appel-
lant requested. We find that such an order 
cannot be used to extend the time for appeal, 
because it does not resolve any issue extant, 
but merely refers to prior orders of the court. 
Thus, the Consolidated Decree of Divorce and 
Orders does not constitute an appealable final 
order. 
A related issue is whether appellant's 
"Objection to Order" suspended the finality of 
the December 31 judgment under R. Utah Ct. 
App. 4(b). The objection, filed January 15, 
1988, does not state .the rule under which it is 
filed. Assuming that the objection was inte-
nded to be filed under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b), 
to amend or make additional findings of fact, 
it was not filed within ten days after entry of 
judgment, as is required by Rule 52(b). Thus, 
appellant's "Objection to Order" does not 
qualify as a post-judgment order which will 
suspend the finality of the December 31, 1987 
judgment under R. Utah Ct. App. 4(b). See 
Burgers v. Maibcn, 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 
1982) (An untimely motion for a new trial 
does not affect the running of time for filing a 
notice of appeal). The notice of appeal, filed 
on March 4, 1988, was not filed within thirty 
days of entry of the December 31, 1987 jud-
gment. Therefore, we dismiss appellant's 
appeal as untimely. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
The procedural history of this case leaves 
much to be desired, due mostly to an ill-
fated attempt to substitute an unrecorded 
conference in chambers for the evidentiary 
hearing which should have been held to 
resolve several disputed property issues. Pro-
longed effort then had to be given in subseq-
uent proceedings to reconstructing what act-
ually transpired during that conference. 
Matters were not helped by withdrawals of 
counsel and the retirement of the initial judge, 
whose successor was left to complete the case 
without the benefit of a full record of what 
had transpired before. 
Like my colleagues, I am perplexed at the 
entry of the consolidated decree. I am not sure 
this decree served any real purpose, or was 
even proper. It is, however, the final order 
entered in this case, for the apparent purpose 
of wrapping up loose ends and setting forth 
the trial court's final judgment. The decree is 
. Hase CODE • co 
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stamped as a judgment and it was docketed as 
a judgment. I would not look behind it for 
purposes of determining the timeliness of this 
appeal. I would take the judgment at face 
value, regard the appeal as timely, and reach 
the merits. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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Defendant appeals from the trial court's 
revocation of his probation. He claims that his 
probation term automatically terminated after 
eighteen months by operation of law pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §77-18-l(10)(a) (Supp. 
1986).l We agree and reverse. 
Defendant pleaded guilty, on September 18, 
19&S, to two third de.gr.ee Celotiy, charges of 
uttering a forged prescription under Utah 
Code Ann. §58-37-8(4)(a)(iii) (1985). On 
March 20, 1986, he was sentenced to two 
indeterminate sentences of zero to five years at 
the Utah State Prison. The trial court suspe-
nded the prison term and placed defendant on 
supervised probation for a term of three years. 
Defendant completed the first eighteen 
months of probation without incident. 
However, on March 25, 1988, he was arrested 
for violating the terms of his probation by 
allegedly committing credit card fraud and for 
driving under the influence. On April 12, 
1988, the trial court ordered defendant to 
appear before the court and show cause why 
his probation should not be revoked. Defen-
dant filed a motion to terminate probation 
Hase v 
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\nc pro tunc. The court denied the motion, 
voked defendant's probation and imposed 
c original two consecutive sentences of zero 
five years. 
Defendant argues on appeal that section 77-
l-l(10)(a) mandated that his probation be 
rminated after eighteen months of incident-
ee probation. The state argues that it is 
ithin the trial court's discretion to sentence 
rfendant to two consecutive terms of prob-
ion and that defendant waived his right to 
rmination of probation by expressly reque-
ing a three-year term of probation in lieu 
fa prison sentence. 
Section 77-18-1 (10)(a) provided that 
[u]pon completion without violation of 18 
lonths probation in felony or class A misde-
leanor cases, ... the offender shall be termi-
ated from sentence, unless the person is 
arlier terminated by the court." In State v. 
Ircen, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
upreme Court held that the term "shall" was 
strong legislative mandate that required 
robation to terminate after eighteen months. 
This strong mandate is not consistent with 
he State's position that the eighteen-month 
erm is 'tolled' when any violation occurs 
/ithin the period and that there is no time 
imit for initiating a revocation action." Id. at 
{64. In response to the state's concerns rega-
ding violation of the public's trust, the court 
xeld that "all but technical violations can be 
junished on their own merits and the defen-
dant's past record can be considered at that 
ime." Id. at 465. 
Furthermore, the court held that the power 
:o revoke probation must be exercised within 
legislatively established limits. 
[W]e reaffirm that judges may 
exercise sentencing discretion within 
those limits established by the legi-
slature; the power to fix sentencing 
limits and the power to suspend 
sentence in favor of probation are 
not inherent in the judiciary but 
must be authorized by statute. 
Id. at 464. 
At the time this matter arose, section 77-18-
l(10)(c) provided the terms for extending 
probation. 
At any time prior to the termination 
of probation the court may, after a 
hearing with proper notice, upon its 
own motion or the motion of the 
prosecutor, extend probation for 
good cause shown,- for one additi-
onal term of 18 months in felony or 
class A misdemeanor cases or six 
months in class B misdemeanor 
cases. The reasons for the extension 
of the probation period shall be 
made a part of the court record. 
(Emphasis added.)2 Defendant served eighteen 
months of incident-free probation. It was 
after this term of eighteen months that the 
court held a hearing and determined that 
defendant's probation should be revoked. 
After reviewing the record, it appears that 
the trial court may have intended to sentence 
defendant to two consecutive terms of prob-
ation lasting eighteen months each. At the 
hearing on the motion to terminate defen-
dant's probation, held approximately two 
years after the probation order went into 
effect, the court stated "[t]he eighteen months 
probation was imposed on each felony to run 
consecutively." However, neither the verbal 
nor the written judgment made any mention 
of two consecutive terms. Rather, the order 
unequivocally stated: "IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that the Defendant, Leon Earl 
Denney, be placed on probation for a period 
of three (3) years from and after March 20, 
1986." 
An unambiguous order made in a criminal 
proceeding cannot be varied by remarks made 
in a later hearing to coincide with what the 
judge may have intended, "Where the lang-
uage of a judgment is clear and unambiguous, 
it must be given effect as it is written ...." Stare 
v. Garcia, 99 N.M. App. 466, 659 P.2d 
918, 923 (1983). It is necessary that sentences 
be rendered with clarity and accuracy in order 
to avoid the possibility of confusion and inj-
ustice. Chase v. State, 479 P.2d 337, 339 
(Alaska 1971). 
Broad and uniform recognition has 
been given to the precept that a 
sentence imposed by a court acting 
in a criminal case should be defi-
nite, unequivocal and unambiguous, 
so that both the defendant and the 
officials charged with executing the 
sentence will be fairly apprised of 
the intentions of the court. 
Id. (footnote omitted). This principle was first 
articulated by the United States Supreme 
Court in United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 
360, 363 (1926), where the Court held that 
"(sjentences in criminal cases should reveal 
with fair certainty the intent of the court and 
exclude any serious misapprehensions by those 
who must execute them." However, "where 
the meaning is ambiguous, the pleadings and 
other documents of record may be reviewed 
for purposes of construing the meaning of the 
judgment." Garcia, 659 P.2d at 923. 
The order, as written and pronounced, 
sentenced the defendant to three years of 
probation. The judge did not state in his order 
that the term of three years was actually two 
consecutive terms of eighteen months each.3 
Although, the judge may have intended the 
terms to run consecutively, we do not examine 
his intent where the written order is unequiv-
58 Ward v. Richfield City UP Utah Adv Rep 58 
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Because the term of probation automatically 
terminated after eighteen months, we do not 
reach the merits of the waiver and estoppel 
argument. 
The judgment is reversed with directions to 
grant the motion nunc pro tunc terminating 
probation. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. Utah Code Ann §77-18-1 was amended in 
1985 and 1987 See 1985 Utah Laws ch. 229, §1, 
1987 Utah Laws ch 114, §1 The provision defen-
dant relies upon in this appeal is currently found in 
Utah Code Ann §77-18-l(7)(a)(Supp 1988) 
2. This section now reads 
At any time prior to the termination of 
probation, upon a minimum of five 
days' notice and a hearing or upon a 
waiver of the notice and hearing by the 
probationer, the court may extend pro-
bation for an additional term of 18 
months in felony or class A misdemea-
nors or six months in class B misdeme-
anors if fines or restitution or both are 
owing. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-l(7)(c)(Supp. 1988). 
3. We do not reach the merits of whether the judge 
may sentence a defendant to two consecutive terms 
of probation under Utah Code Ann §76-3-
201(1) (Supp 1988). 
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OPINION 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
This appeal concerns whether appellant, 
Boyd Ward, was properly dismissed as Rich-
field City Chief of Police Ward claimed 
below that the Utah Open and Public Meet-
ings Act was violated, that the Richfield City 
Council disregarded a temporary restraining 
order by taking further subsequent action to 
dismiss him as Chief of Police, and that his 
request for an administrative appeal was 
improperly denied. The trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Richfield City 
We affirm 
FACTS 
On April 2, 1981, the Richfield City Council 
held a public meeting after publishing an 
agenda as required by Utah Code Ann §52-
4-6 (1981). The agenda did not list Ward's 
discharge as Chief of Police Following disc-
ussion of items on the agenda, the Council 
voted to hold a closed meeting and invited 
Ward to join them in discussing his position as 
Chief of Police The Council was concerned 
about several recent resignations within the 
police department. Discussion of Ward's ter-
mination ensued and the Council decided to 
terminate Ward. The Council resumed open 
session and formally voted to discharge Ward 
effective April 3,1981. 
On April 6, 1981, Ward submitted a written 
request to the Council for an administrative 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§10-
3-1105 and-1106 (1981). The request was 
denied. On June 5, 1981, the Council publi-
shed notice that a special meeting would be 
held on June 8, 1981, to ratify its actions 
taken at the April meeting. The Council pub-
lished an agenda that included Ward's disch-
arge as an item for discussion. Prior to the 
meeting. Ward served the Council with a 
temporary restraining order, to restrain it 
from taking any further action against him. 
Despite the temporary restraining order, the 
Council ratified its decision to terminate 
Ward. 
On June 17, 1981, the trial court held a 
preliminary injunction hearing and determined 
that pursuant to the removal statute for chiefs 
of police, Utah Code Ann. §10-3-911 
(repealed 1987), it had no jurisdiction to hear 
the matter. Section 10-3-911 stated in part 
that *[t]he chief of police or fire department 
of the cities may at any time be removed, 
without a trial, hearing or opportunity to be 
heard, by the board of commissioners when-
ever in its opinion the good of the service will 
be served thereby." 
Ward appealed the trial court's decision to 
the Utah Supreme Court and the court decided 
in Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P 2d 265 (Utah 
1984), that the trial court did have jurisdiction 
because section 10-3-911 did not pertain to 
third class cities. The case was remanded to 
the trial court. On remand, the trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Rich-
field City The court ruled that although the 
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